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WHAT ISCRITICAL RACE FEMINISM?
Leila Hiar
Critical race feminism, a proposed offshoot of critical race theory,'
debuts in Adrien K.Wing's volume Oit IRace Femnism:A Reader. InWing's
words, the volume "focuses on [women of color,] who face multiple
discrimination on the basis of race, gender and class, revealing how all these
factors interact within a system of white male patriarchy and racist oppression."
Indeed, the volume offers critical details of how race, gender, and sometimes
class, relate in avariety ofcontexts. In contextualizing the experience of women
of color, critical race feminism evinces that race and gender interact in a
multiplicative fashion to influence both the identity of and discrimination against
women of color. Because the connection between race and gender has
traditionally been ignored or subordinated under the law and in American
society, critical race feminism isan invaluable elaboration of the meaning of the
intersection of race and gender.2
Critical race feminism serves another instructional purpose by way of its
coverage of socio-economic and political issues facing communities of color,
matters under explored in critical race theory. The chapter on "Mothering or
Not," for instance, discusses societies' devaluing of poor women of color in

. J.D., (1998) University at Buffhlo School of Law; BA, (1992) The Evergreen State
College. The author researched women's rights in the Gaza Strip under the auspices of
the Palestinian Center for Human Rights during the summer of 1997.
' Critical race theory isan American scholarly movement composed mostly of law
professors of color, who employ both postmodem and modern tenets in discussing the
treatment, or lackthereof, of race inthe American legal system and society. Critical race
theory borrows from the older critical legal studies movement and directs much of its
critique atthe liberal civil rights tradition. See CRrITCAL RACE THEORY: THE KIEYWRITINGS

THAT FoRMED THE MOEMENT (KmbertCrenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
2 The intersection of race and gender isan issue long explored by women of color law
professors. For foundational articles on this topic see Kimber& Crenshaw,
Demarginazng the Intesectbn of Race and Sex. A Black Feminist Critique of
Anawriminatb Docbj, Feminist 7heoryandAn.racistPo/Ics, U. CHI. LEGAL F.139
(1989); Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism, 42 STAN. L REv. 581 (1990); Man
Matsuda, 144,en the Frst Quail Cas: Multiple CosciousnessasJurispruden'alMethod,
II WOMEN'S RTs. L REP. 7 (1989); Judy Scales-Trent, Bkack Women and the
Conshon, HA. C.R.-C.L L REV. (1989); PatridaJ. Williams, Sirit-Murdenngthe
Messenger, 42 U.MiAIi L REv. 127 (1987). With the exception of Crenshaw's and
Matsuda's artides, shortened reprints of these writings are induded inthe volume.
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order to justify coercive policies and laws that exploit the class, gender, and
political powerlessness of such women. These writings, among others in the
volume, chart important territory in the field of critical race theory.
Moreover, critical race feminist critiques concern the limitations and
consequences of modem rights, namely "equality" and "nondiscrimination," and
thus, provide a useful forum for questioning the impartial, objective, and
formalistic nature ofthe rule of law and antidiscrimination doctrine. International
women's human rights activists and scholars in particular will benefit from
engaging critical race feminism. The international rights of women are modeled
on the norm of nondiscrimination and manifest similar dilemmas highlighted by
critical race feminists. As their writings reveal, conventional nondiscrimination
ideology forces women into narrow, rigid categories in orderto realize rights that
neither embrace the totality of their experience nor the discrimination they face.
This leads to bifurcated identities and injuries, lower or irrelevant legal
protections, and fragmented political movements. Critical race feminist
scholarship effectively illustrates these conditions and negative outcomes.
Critical race feminism is an informative legal discussion on race and
gender that advances a critique of liberal paradigms pertinent at both the national
and intemational levels, but its import stops here. Contraryto its implied claim
of a distinctive theoretical contribution, critical race feminism is less a step
towards a "minority feminist jurisprudence" and more a testament of race and
gender under the law. As presented in Wing's volume, critical race feminism is
not concentrated or distinct enough to be the basis of a jurisprudence for
women of color.
The volume was edited with the purpose of including a wide range of
scholars, resulting in a diffuse presentation of critical race feminism. Despite its
black heritage3 and stated intent of countering the assumption that one group's
experience reflects that of all groups, the volume speaks for the broad category
ofwomen of color. While the sweeping scope of the volume supports coalition
building, creating an oppositional legal doctrine may require a more precise
critique; that is, coalitions may be necessary to gain political power, but
developing a "minority feminist jurisprudence" may be better facilitated by a
confined analysis of black women and the law. Inturn, such analysis, however
modified, could be applied to the wider pool of women of color.

Wing places the 1991 Be'keleyWomen'sLawJoumalsymposium on Black Women
Law Professors: Building a Community at the Intersection of Race and Gender as an
impetus for the volume.
3
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Further jeopardizing the formulation of a race and gender-specific
jurisprudence, the volume indudes an overwhelming number of writings, 45 in
all. The inclusive stance of the volume compromises the more provocative and
jurisprudentially significant articles, which were pared down to make room for
the many other included works. The result is a volume of narrowly edited
articles and essays that offer more thoughts and experiences in the area of race
and gender and less substantive approaches to their intersection.
In fact, Wing may have intentionally sacrificed legal theory for the sake
ofproducing a "reader" of practical use. The volume isorganized thematically,
with a concluding "Questions and Suggested Readings' section at the end of each
chapter. The kinds of questions raised in these sections make the volume an
effective tool for raising issues within diverse settings - classes, community
centers, and activist circles. The wide applicability of the volume makes it
especially relevant as a general forum for questioning abstract paradigms and
discussing how liberal models and societies fail to accommodate the particulars
of individuals and groups. On the other hand, foregoing substance and definition
has undermined the jurisprudential insight of critical race feminism.
A more fundamental jurisprudential limitation of critical race feminism
belongs more generallyto citical race theory. Critical race theory holds standard
rights discourse as a source ofempowerment, as well as oppression. Underthis
dualistic, and somewhat disharmonious approach to rights, most critical race
theory scholarship is devoted to deconstructing ostensibly race-neutral law
towards a reconstruction that accounts for race dynamics. Much of the
reconstruction race crits engage in utilizes the same materials embodied in that
which is being deconstructed, albeit with due consideration to details,
experience, and more progressive notions of racial justice. Critical race theory,
then, emphasizes racializing current rights discourse, rather than creating an
alternative vision. For the most part, critical race feminism reproduces this
shortcoming.
Afew exceptions contined in Wing's volume demonstrate what more
is needed from critical race feminism. Regina Austin's reprinted article, Black
Women, Ssteniood,and the DifferencelDeviance Divide, analyzes the case of
Ruby Clark, a black woman who brought suit against ABC for a 'TV news
broadcastthat likened hertoa prostitute in a Detroit neighborhood. In orderto
argue her claim of libel, Clark had to promote mainstream (white) notions of
acceptable behavior and stereotypes of black woman and black women
prostitutes. Through her counter analysis of the case, Austin argues that, "[n]o
external sources of morals and values can supply the norms and values by which
black women interact with each other." Austin provocatively suggests that black
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women should question dominant assumptions and possibly reformulate their
own norms that respond to the collective or communal concerns of black
women.
Dorothy Roberts similarly pushes for a re-imaging of the law. In
PunkhingDrugAddics Who Have Babhks: Women ofColor, Equality and the
htoffrhac Roberts calls for a reconceptualization of the constitutional right
to privacy so that it accounts for the historical subordination of black mothers.
likewise, Patricia Williams' ground breaking writing on "spirit-injury," featured in
the volume calls for a legal response to the unnamed, often sub-conscious, social
structures of racism. In Sit-Murdering t6e Messenger The Discourse of
Fingerpointingas the Law's Response to Racism, Williams describes the
shooting-death of Eleanor Bumpurs, a'270-pound, arthritic, sixty-seven-year-old
Woman." Bumpurs was shot by New York City police officers, who were trying
to evict the elderly women for being $98.85 behind in her rent. Williams
criticizes the law's insulation of the New York City Police Commissioner's claim
that, though the police were white and Eleanor was black, there was 'no
evidence of racism.' Under the relevant law, the police have the discretion to
shoot, and because Eleanor was resisting eviction, invocation of that power was
deemed race-neutral. Inmaking acase for legal protection against the subtly, but
potentially more devastating racist injuries of "spirit-murdering," Williams argues
for a more comprehensive conceptualization of discrimination.
These featured writings go furthertowards creating ajurisprudence that
serves the interests of women of color. Unfortunately, the volume does not
give adequate space to such writings. To be sure, establishing a rights discourse
that addresses the complex realities and serves the needs of women of color,
and other minority groups, faces an inherent impediment in legal discourse. In
other words, the liberation of marginalized peoples can be aided only so far by
law and legal scholarship.
Notwithstanding its jurisprudential weaknesses, the volume contains
powerful writings that may encourage further evaluation of the interplay of race,
gender, and class in legal environments, and will surely encourage frank
discussions in the classroom and community circles. Moreover, critical race
feminism can shed light on the restrictive nature of international human rights
law, particularly in the area of women's human rights. Besides its directly
relevant chapter addressing international human rights situations ("Beyond our
Borders: Global Issues), critical race feminism analyses may help prove the need
for a multicultural evolution of the human rights discourse and begin to steer
women's human rights away from the pitfalls of antidiscrimination doctrine and
an abstract rule of law.

